Backward induction is characterized in an epistemic model of perfect information games where players have common certain belief of the consistency of preferences rather than the rationality of choice. In this approach, backward induction corresponds to common certain belief of 'belief in each subgame of opponent rationality'. At an interpretative level this result resembles the one established by Aumann [Games Econ. Behav. 8 (1995) 6-19]. By instead imposing common certain belief of 'belief (only in the whole game) of opponent rationality', Ben-Porath's [Rev. Econ. Stud. 64 (1997) 23-46] support for the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure is interpreted. 
. Introduction
In recent years, two influential contributions on backward induction in finite perfect information games have appeared, namely Aumann (1995) and Ben-Porath (1997) . These contributions-both of which consider generic perfect information games (where all payoffs are different)-reach opposite conclusions: while Aumann establishes that Common Knowledge of Rationality implies that the backward induction outcome is reached, Ben-Porath shows that the backward induction outcome is not the only outcome that is consistent with Common Certainty of Rationality. The models of Aumann and Ben-Porath are different. One such difference is that Aumann makes use of 'knowledge' in the sense of 'true knowledge', while Ben-Porath's analysis is based on 'certainty' in the sense of 'belief with probability 1'. Another is that the term 'rationality' is used in different senses.
The present paper shows how the conclusions of Aumann and Ben-Porath can be captured by imposing requirements on the players within the same general framework. Furthermore, the interpretations of the present analysis correspond closely to the intuitions that Aumann and Ben-Porath convey in their discussions. Hence, the present contribution may increase our understanding of the differences between the analyses of Aumann and Ben-Porath, and thereby enhance our understanding of the epistemic conditions underlying backward induction. For ease of presentation, the analysis will be limited to two-player games. This is purely a matter of convenience as everything can directly be generalized to n-player games (with n . 2).
1
Among the large literature on backward induction during the last couple of decades, Reny's (1993) impossibility result is of special importance. Reny associates a player's 'rationality' in an extensive game with what is called 'weak sequential rationality'; i.e. that a player chooses rationally in all subgames that are not precluded from being reached by the player's own strategy. He shows that there exist perfect information games where the event that both players satisfy weak sequential rationality cannot be commonly believed in all subgames. For example, in the centipede game that is illustrated in Fig. 1 of Section 4.2, common belief of weak sequential rationality cannot be held in the subgame defined by 2's decision node. The reason is that if 1 believes that 2 is rational in the subgame, and if 1 believes that 2 believes that 1 will be rational in the subgame defined by 1's second decision node, then 1 believes that 2 will choose d, implying that only D is a best response for 1. Then the fact that the subgame defined by 2's decision node has been reached, contradicts 2's belief that 1 is rational in the whole game.
As a response, Ben-Porath (1997) imposes that common belief of weak sequential rationality is held in the whole game only. However, weak sequential rationality being commonly believed in the whole game only, does not imply backward induction. In the centipede game of Fig. 1 , the strategies D and FD for player 1 and d and f for player 2 are consistent with such common belief, while backward induction implies that down is played at any decision node.
In order to obtain an epistemic characterization of backward induction, Aumann (1995) considers 'sequential rationality' in the sense that a player chooses rationally in all subgames (see also footnote 5). However, the event that players satisfy sequential rationality is somewhat problematic. If-in the centipede game of Fig. 1 -1 believes or knows that 2 chooses d, then only by choosing the strategy DD will 1 satisfy sequential rationality. However, what does it mean that 1 chooses DD in the counterfactual event that player 2's decision node were reached? It is perhaps more natural-as suggested by Stalnaker (1998, Sect. 5) -to consider 2's belief about 1's subsequent action if 2's decision node were reached. Since Aumann (1995) assumes knowledge of rational choice in an S5 partition structure, such a question of belief revision cannot be asked within Aumann's model.
By imposing a full support restriction (cf. Definition 1) the present paper ensures that each player takes all opponent strategies into account, having the structural implication that conditional beliefs are well-defined and the behavioral implication that a rational choice in the whole game is a rational choice in all subgames that are not precluded from being reached by the player's own strategy. Hence, by this restriction, we may consider 'rationality' instead of 'weak sequential rationality' (as shown by Lemma 2 and the subsequent text).
The main distinguishing feature of the present analysis is, however, to consider the event that a player believes in opponent rationality rather than the event that the player himself is rational. Asheim and Dufwenberg (2002) (AD) show the following result (reproduced as Proposition 6 of Section 4.1): strategies surviving the Dekel-Fudenberg (Dekel and Fudenberg, 1990) procedure, where one round of weak elimination is followed by iterated strong elimination, can be characterized as maximal strategies when there is common certain belief that each player believes in the whole game that the opponent chooses rationally ('belief of opponent rationality'). For generic perfect information games, Ben-Porath shows that the set of outcomes consistent with common belief of weak sequential rationality corresponds to the set of outcomes that survives the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure. Hence, maximal strategies when there is common certain belief of 'belief of opponent rationality' correspond to outcomes that are promoted by Ben-Porath's analysis.
An extensive game offers choice situations, not only in the whole game, but also in proper subgames. In perfect information games (and, more generally, in multi-stage games) the subgames constitute an exhaustive set of such choice situations. Hence, in perfect information games one can replace 'belief of opponent rationality' by 'belief in each subgame of opponent rationality': each player believes in each subgame that his opponent chooses rationally in the subgame. The main results of the present paper (Propositions 7 and 8 of Section 5.2) show how, for generic perfect information games, common certain belief of 'belief in each subgame of opponent rationality' is possible and uniquely determines the backward induction outcome. Hence, by substituting 'belief in each subgame of opponent rationality' for 'belief of opponent rationality', the present analysis provides an alternative route to Aumann's conclusion, namely that common knowledge (or certain belief) of an appropriate form of (belief of) rationality implies backward induction.
This epistemic foundation for backward induction requires common certain belief of 'belief in each subgame of opponent rationality', where the term 'certain belief' is being used in the sense that an event is certainly believed if the complement is subjectively impossible (cf. Section 3.2). As shown by a counterexample in Section 5.2, the characterization does not obtain if instead common belief (in a sense of belief with probability 1) is applied. Furthermore, the event of which there is common certain belief-namely 'belief in each subgame of opponent rationality'-cannot be further restricted by taking the intersection with the event of 'rationality'. The reason is that the full support restriction of Definition 1 is inconsistent with certain belief of opponent 'rationality', as the latter prevents a player from taking into account irrational opponent choices and rules out a well-defined theory of belief revision.
The imposition of 'belief (in each subgame) of opponent rationality' restricts the beliefs of players. Thus, the analysis follows AD by suggesting that in deductive game theory, requirements can be imposed on the beliefs of players rather than their choice. Since the beliefs of players are determined by their preferences, this amounts to 2 imposing requirements on preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the formal framework in which extensive games will be analyzed. Section 4 reviews AD's characterization of the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure and applies this result to generic extensive games of perfect information, thereby comparing the present analysis to that of Ben-Porath (1997) . Section 5 introduces 'belief in each subgame of opponent rationality' as an alternative epistemic condition and establishes the paper's main results. Section 6 interprets the present approach in terms of adding belief revision to Aumann's (1995) analysis, and discusses the relationship to Battigalli's (1996) concept of 'rationality orderings'.
. States, types, and preferences
The purpose of this section is to present a framework for extensive games where each player is modeled as a decision maker under uncertainty. The decision-theoretic analysis builds on Blume et al. (1991a) . The framework is summarized by the concept of a belief system (cf. Definition 1). Appendix A contains a presentation of the decision-theoretic terminology, notation, and results that will be utilized.
.1. An extensive game form
Inspired by Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, Chap. 6 ), a finite extensive game form of almost perfect information with two players and M 2 1 stages can be described as follows. Both perfect information games and finitely repeated games yield game forms that fit this description. The sets of histories is determined inductively: the set of Instead of imposing that a driver chooses to drive on the right side of the road if he believes that his opponent chooses to drive on the right side of the road, AD suggest to impose that a driver prefers to drive on the right side of the road if he believes that his opponent prefers to drive on the right side of the road. This follows a tradition in equilibrium analysis where Nash (perfect / proper) equilibrium is defined as an equilibrium in conjectures (cf. Blume et al., 1991b 
.2. States and types
The uncertainty faced by a player i in a strategic game form concerns the strategy choice of his opponent j, j's belief about i's strategy choice, and so on (see Tan and Werlang, 1988) . A type of a player i corresponds to a vNM utility function and a belief about j's strategy choice, a belief about j's belief about i's strategy choice, and so on. Models of such infinite hierarchies of beliefs (Boge and Eisele, 1979; Mertens and Zamir, 1985; Brandenburger and Dekel, 1993; Epstein and Wang, 1996) yield S 3 T as the complete state space, where T 5 T 3 T is the set of all feasible type vectors. In conformity with the literature on infinite hierarchies of beliefs, let
• the set of states of the world (or simply states) be V[S 3 T, t i
• each type t of any player i correspond to a binary relation K on the set of acts on i S 3 T . randomizations on Z. Assume that K has full support on S (cf. Appendix A), implying j that, for any subgame, conditional preferences are nontrivial (cf. Section 2.3) and the conditional belief operator is 'well-defined' (cf. Section 3.3).
The construction is summarized by the following definition.
Definition 1.
A belief system for a game form (S , S , z) consists of 1 2
• for each player i, a finite set of types T ,
• for each type t of any player i, a binary relation K (t 's preferences) on the set of
acts on S 3 T , where K has full support on S and is represented by a vNM utility
function y on D(Z) and an LPS l on S 3 T .
i jj
.3. Conditional preferences and rationality t t i i
Let
K is a binary relation also on the subset of acts on S that correspond to i's mixed Let, for any subgame h, K denote the conditional binary relation (cf. Appendix A)
mixed strategies in h. Since K is reflexive and transitive and satisfies objective
independence, K shares these properties, and
is non-empty and supports any maximal mixed strategy. Refer to C (h) as t 's choice set
in the subgame h. Write C [C (5), and write, for any
By the following lemma, if s is maximal in a subgame h, then s is maximal in any i i later subgame that s is consistent with. 
Definition 3. The pure strategy s is a rational choice by t in h if s [ C (h).
The event that i is rational in h is defined as
The assumption that K has full support on S (cf. Section 2.2) has the structural j t i
implication that, for all h, the conditional preferences, K , are nontrivial. Moreover,
by Lemma 2 it has the behavioral implication that any choice s that is rational in h is i also rational in any later subgame that s is consistent with. This means that 'rationality'
, implying that any strategy that is weakly dominated in h cannot be rational in h. Thus, preference for cautious behavior is induced. However, in the context of generic perfect information games (cf. Section 4.2) such admissibility has no cutting power beyond ensuring that 'rationality' implies 'weak sequential rationality' (see e.g. BenPorath, 1997, Lemma 1.2). Hence, in the class of games considered in our main results it is of no consequence to use 'rationality' combined with full support rather than 'weak sequential rationality'.
.4. An extensive game
Consider an extensive game form (cf. Section 2.1), and let, for each i, y : Z → R be a i vNM utility function that assigns payoff to any outcome. Then the pair of the extensive game form and the vNM utility functions (y , y ) is a finite extensive game of almost
game, where for each i, the vNM utility function u : S → R is defined by u 5 y + z (i.e.
that u (r) . u (s). The event that i plays the game G is given by
is the event that both players play G.
1 2
. Epistemic operators
The results on backward induction in Section 5.2 will be based on two epistemic operators: 'certain belief' about the type of the opponent, and 'conditional belief' about the rationality of the opponent in subgames. These are subjective operators derived from the LPSs that represent the preferences of player types. It is essential that preferences are defined also over fictitious acts that do not correspond to actual strategies; in particular, such acts are needed to elicit beliefs about the type of the opponent.
To state these operators, let, for each player i and each state v [ V, t (v) denote the i projection of v on T . It will follow that at v i 'certainly believes' and 'conditionally i believes' the event that his type is t (v). As it is unnecessary to specify at v i's belief i about his own strategy choice, we consider only events E # V satisfying that E 5 S 3 i proj E. For for any subgame h and any such event E, let
denote the set of opponent strategy-type pairs that are consistent with h, v [ E and
.1. Possibility and epistemic priority
An LPS determines both possibility of opponent strategy-type pairs and epistemic priority of opponent strategy-type pairs (see e.g. Stalnaker, 1998, Section 3) . To see
and construct the following collection of nested sets: 
That i's opponent makes a strategy choice consistent with a subgame h [ H is an event S 3 S (h) 3 T 3 T that is objectively knowable for i if subgame h is reached.
Since Definition 1 entails that t 's LPS, l , has full support on S , t 's preferences
conditional on S (h) 3 T are non-trivial and represented by a conditional LPS l (h) 5
follows from Blume et al.'s definition that the set of opponent strategy-type pairs given the highest epistemic priority under the conditional LPS,
equals the set of pairs given the highest epistemic priority under the unconditional LPS,
The operator K corresponds to what Morris (1997) calls 'Savage-belief'. It is stronger i than Ben-Porath's (1997) 'certainty' as it does not allow the complement of a certainly believed event to be taken into account, but weaker than Aumann's (1995) 'knowledge' as a certainly believed event need not be true.
If E # V satisfies that E 5 S 3 S 3 proj E, then say that there is that, at v, there
.3. Conditional belief
Since Definition 1 entails that all opponent strategies are deemed possible, belief
about the rationality of the opponent in subgames cannot be associated with k . Rather, j it will be based on the set of opponent strategy-pair that has the highest epistemic priority under the conditional LPS.
Since b (h)[suppm (h), B (h) corresponds to 'belief with probability 1'.
satisfies minimal belief revision (see e.g. Alchourron et al., 1985) .
For any h and at any v, it follows from the property that K has full support on S j that i's belief conditional on the subgame h is 'well-defined' (in the sense that the
belief in h is implied by full support alone; it does not require that h is actually being reached. This means that a requirement on i's belief conditional on h is a requirement on the type of player i only; it does not impose that i makes a strategy choice consistent with h. Since the conditional belief operator is used only for objectively knowable events that are subjectively possible, we do not consider hypothetical events. Hence, hypothetical epistemic operators of the kind developed by Samet (1996) are not needed in the present framework.
Write
.4. Properties
It can easily be shown that the following properties hold for any h [ H. Firstly, since
, it follows that certain belief implies conditional belief:
Moreover, the operators K and B (h) satisfy
. Hence, both operators B (h) and K correspond to KD45
systems.
.5. Are subjective probabilities needed?
An LPS is a representation of preferences that are based on subjective probabilities. However, one can convincingly argue that subjective probabilities are not part of the backward induction argument; indeed, it plays no role in Aumann's (1995) article. It might therefore be of interest to point out that the present analysis does not actually depend on subjective probabilities.
By weakening completeness to conditional completeness while keeping the remaining
conditions on K -reflexivity, transitivity, objective independence, nontriviality, conditional continuity and non-null state independence-it follows directly from the vNM t i theorem that preferences are conditionally represented by a vNM utility function, y , i without necessarily determining the relative subjective likelihood of any two opponent strategy-type pairs. The preferences still determine, for each subgame, a choice set (e.g. a non-empty set of maximal pure strategies that supports any maximal mixed strategy) since this only requires reflexivity, transitivity and objective independence. Moreover, the preferences still determine possibility (e.g. opponent strategy-type pairs not being Savage-null) and epistemic priority (e.g. one opponent strategy-type pair being infinitely more likely than is a system of conditional filter generating sets (cf. Brandenburger, 1998, Section 5) .
However, even when completeness is not imposed, K in general encode more information about t 's preferences than can be recovered from such a system of i conditional filter generating sets.
. Belief of opponent rationality
Usually requirements in deductive game theory are imposed on choice. For example,
rationality is the requirement that a pair (s , t ) satisfies s [ C . The present paper
follows AD by imposing requirements on t only. Since t corresponds to the preferences
K , such requirements will be imposed on K . Here we focus on showing how such an approach to deductive game-theoretic analysis can be used to shed light on the analyses of Aumann (1995) and Ben-Porath (1997) , and thereby enhance our understanding of the epistemic conditions underlying backward induction. For this purpose, it is useful to reproduce AD's characterization of the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure.
.1. Admissible consistency
The Dekel-Fudenberg procedure is made up of one round of elimination of weakly dominated strategies followed by iterated elimination of strongly dominated strategies. AD characterize this procedure by imposing two requirements in addition to ensuringwhat is captured by the assumption of full support on S in the present paper-that each j player takes all opponent strategies into account, thereby taking into account the possibility that any subgame in an extensive game be reached: the first of these ensures that each player plays the game G, while the second requirement ensures that each player believes that the opponent chooses rationally (belief of opponent rationality). Hence, consider the following event
Since K is represented by y and an LPS l 5 (m , . Proof. The assumption of 'caution' in AD is here weakened to full support on S . The j only-if part follows directly from the first part of Proposition 5.2 in AD. The if part follows from the second part of Proposition 5.2 in AD, subject to a straightforward modification due to the weakening of 'caution' to full support on S . In both parts of the j proof it is without consequence that complete preferences must be substituted for the (possibly) incomplete preferences used by AD. h
Say that at v i is admissibly consistent (with the game G and the preferences of his opponent) if v [ A , where
The characterization result of Proposition 6 is obtained also if CBA is used instead of CKA; this is essentially the corresponding result by Brandenburger (1992) . The result of AD is more complicated as it involves two different epistemic operators. Still, it yields the insight that the essential feature in a characterization of the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure is to let irrational opponent choice be deemed possible. It also turns out to be a useful benchmark for the analysis of backward induction in Section 5 where common belief cannot be applied.
.2. Generic games of perfect information
A finite extensive game is
• . . . of perfect information if, at any h [ H, there exists at most one player that has a non-singleton action set; • . . . generic if, for each i, y (z) ± y (z9) whenever z and z9 are different outcomes.
i i
Generic extensive games of perfect information have a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. Moreover, in such games the procedure of backward induction yields in any subgame the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome. If p denotes the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium, then, for any subgame h, z( pu ) is the backward induction h outcome in the subgame h, and S(z( pu )) is the set of strategy vectors consistent with the h backward induction outcome in the subgame h.
Both Aumann (1995) and Ben-Porath (1997) analyze generic extensive games of perfect information. As already pointed out, while Aumann establishes that common 5 (true) knowledge of (sequential) rationality implies that the backward induction outcome is reached, Ben-Porath shows that the backward induction outcome is not the only outcome that is consistent with common belief (in the whole game) of (weak sequential) rationality. The purpose of the present section is to interpret the analysis of Ben-Porath by applying Proposition 6 to the class of generic perfect information games.
Ben-Porath (1997) establishes through his Theorem 1 that the set of outcomes consistent with common belief (in the whole game) of (weak sequential) rationality corresponds to the set of outcomes that survive the Dekel-Fudenberg procedure. Hence, by Proposition 6, maximal strategies when there is common certain belief of admissible consistency correspond to the outcomes promoted by Ben-Porath's analysis.
To illustrate how common certain belief of admissible consistency is consistent with outcomes other than the unique backward induction outcome, consider the simple centipede game of Fig. 1 where backward induction implies that down is being played at 9 99 9 99
any decision node. Let T 5 ht , t j and T 5 ht , t j. Assume that the preferences of Table 1 , the first numbers in the i i j j parentheses express primary probability distributions, while the second numbers express secondary probability distributions. The strategies DD and DF are merged as their relative likelihood does not matter; see footnote 3. Note that all types satisfy the full support requirement of Definition 1. With these two-level LPSs each type's preferences over the player's own strategies are given by
It is easy to check that all types satisfy 'belief of opponent rationality' (e.g. both t and Table 1 A belief system for the game of Fig. 1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 t : t t t : t t 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 t : t t t : t t
Ben-Porath, a 'surprise' has occurred. Subsequent to such a surprise, a type need not believe that the opponent type chooses rationally among his remaining strategies.
. Belief in each subgame of opponent rationality
A simultaneous game offers only one choice situation. Hence, for a game in this class, it seems reasonable that belief of opponent rationality is held in the whole game only, as formalized by the requirement 'belief of opponent rationality'. An extensive game with a nontrivial dynamic structure, however, offers such choice situations, not only in the whole game, but also in proper subgames. Moreover, for extensive games of almost perfect information, the subgames constitute an exhaustive set of such choice situations. This motivates imposing belief in each subgame of opponent rationality. Hence, consider the event that i believes conditional on h that j is rational in h:
then at v i believes conditional on any subgame h that j is h[H i j rational in h. In other words, > B (h)[rat (h)] is the event that player i believes in
each subgame h that the opponent j is rational in h. Consider a finite extensive game G of almost perfect information with corresponding strategic game G. Say that at v i is admissibly subgame consistent (with G and the definition of admissible subgame consistency can be applied to any finite extensive game of almost perfect information. However, in order to relate to Aumann's (1995) Theorems A and B, the following analysis is concerned with generic perfect information games.
.1. The example revisited

99
In the belief system of Table 1 , type t does not satisfy 'belief in each subgame of 2 opponent rationality'. By 'belief in each subgame of opponent rationality', any type of player 2 must believe, conditional on the subgame defined by 2's decision node, that 1 6 Note that the requirement of such 'belief in each subgame of opponent rationality' allows a player to update his belief about the type of his opponent. Hence, there is no assumption of 'epistemic independence' between different agents in the sense of Stalnaker (1998) ; cf. the remark after the proof of Proposition 7 as well as Section 6.1. Still, the requirement can be considered a non-inductive analogue to 'forward knowledge of rationality' as defined by Balkenborg and Winter (1997) , and it is related to the requirement in Samet (1996, Section 5 ) that each player hypothesizes that if h were reached, then the opponent would behave rationally at h.
chooses his maximal strategy, FD, in the subgame. This means that any type of player 2 prefers d to f, implying that no type of player 1 satisfying 'belief in each subgame of opponent rationality' can prefer FD to D. Thus, common certain belief of admissible subgame consistency entails that any types of players 1 and 2 have the preferences
respectively, meaning that if any type of a player chooses a maximal strategy in a subgame, then his choice is made in accordance with backward induction. Demonstrating that this conclusion holds in general for generic perfect information games is the main result of the present paper.
.2. Main results
In analogy with Aumann's (1995) Proof. With KE 5 K E > K E as the mutual certain belief operator defined on hE #
and since K 5 5 5, conjunction, and positive and negative 
* *
where, for each i, A 5 S 3 S 3 proj A 3 T , implying that mutual certain belief of
In view of these properties, it is sufficient to show for any g 5 0, . . . , M 2 2 that if g Fig. 2 . A four-legged centipede game.
M 22
subgame consistency in order to obtain backward induction. Hence, K A* can be substituted for CKA*.
Backward induction will not be obtained, however, if CBA* is substituted for CKA*. This can be shown by considering a counter-example that builds on the four-legged centipede game of Fig. 2 and the belief system of Table 2. In the table the preferences of that A* 5 S 3 ht , t j 3 ht , t j, since t does not satisfy 'belief in each subgame of 1 1 2 2 1 9 99 opponent rationality'. Provided that i is of a type in ht , t j, it follows that i believes at i i 9 99
(s, t , t ) that the opponent is of a type in ht , t j. This implies that CBA* 5 A*. Since
FD is the maximal strategy for t and fd is the maximal strategy for t , it follows that 1 2 preferences consistent with common belief of admissible subgame consistency need not 99 reflect backward induction. However, 2 does not certainly believe at (s, t , t ) that the 1 2 999 9 99 9 opponent is not of type t . Therefore, KA* 5 A* 5 S 3 ht , t j 3 ht j, while KKA* 5 5. type t , then in the whole game 1 assigns (primary) probability 4 / 5 to 2 being of type t utility function y satisfying y + z 5 u and the LPS l , then (1) the full support
requirement of Definition 1 is satisfied and,
By (1) and (2),
The constructive proof of Propostion 8 can be used to show, for any game of almost perfect information and for any subgame-perfect equilibrium (in strategies that are not weakly dominated), that the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome corresponds to a vector of maximal strategies in a state where there is common certain belief of admissible subgame consistency.
. Discussion
In this section we first interpret our analysis in view of Aumann (1995) and then present a discussion of the relationship to Battigalli (1996) .
.1. Adding belief revision to Aumann's analysis
Consider a generic perfect information game. Say that a type's preferences are in accordance with backward induction if, in any subgame, a strategy is a rational choice only if it is consistent with the backward induction outcome. Using this terminology, Proposition 7 can be restated as follows: under common certain belief of admissible subgame consistency, players are of types with preferences that are in accordance with backward induction. Furthermore, common certain belief of admissible subgame consistency implies that each player deems it impossible that the opponent is of a type with preferences not in accordance with backward induction.
However, since admissible subgame consistency is imposed on preferences, reaching 2's decision node and 1's second decision node in the centipede game of Fig. 1 does not contradict common certain belief of admissible subgame consistency. Of course, these decision nodes will not be reached if players choose rationally. But that players satisfy 'belief in each subgame of opponent rationality' is not a requirement concerning whether their own choice is rational; rather, it means that they believe (with probability 1) in any subgame that their opponent will choose rationally. Combined with the full support restriction of Definition 1, which entails that each player deems any opponent strategy possible, this means that belief revision is well-defined. Hence, on the one hand, we capture the spirit of a conclusion that can be drawn from Aumann's (1995) analysis, namely that when being made subject to epistemic modeling backward induction corresponds to each player having knowledge (or being certain) of some essential feature of the opponent. In Aumann's case, each player deems it impossible-under common (true) knowledge of (sequential) rationality-that the opponent makes an action inconsistent with backward induction. The analogous result in the present case is that each player deems it impossible-under common certain belief of admissible subgame consistency-that the opponent has preferences not in accordance with backward induction.
On the other hand, we are still able to present an explicit analysis of how players revise their beliefs about the opponent's subsequent choice if surprising actions were to be made. As noted in the Introduction, this fundamental issue of belief revision cannot formally be raised within Aumann's framework. Stalnaker (1998) argues-contrary to statements made by Aumann (1995, Section 5f)-that an assumption of belief revision is implicit in Aumann's motivation, namely that information about different agents of the opponent is treated as epistemically 7 independent. In the reformulation by Halpern (1998) , this means that in a state 'closest' to the current state when a player learns that the opponent has not followed her strategy, he believes that the opponent will follow her strategy in the remaining subgame.
There is no assumption of 'epistemic independence' in the current interpretation of Aumann's result. Instead, we have changed statements 'about opponents' from being concerned with strategy choice to being related to preferences. While it is desirable when modeling backward induction to have an explicit theory of revision of beliefs about opponent choice, a theory of revision of beliefs about opponent preferences is inconsistent with maintaining both (a) that preferences are necessarily revealed from choice, and (b) that there is common certain belief of the game being played (i.e. consider the case where A (5) is non-singleton, and a [ A (5) ends the game and leads
to an outcome that is preferred by i to any other outcome). Here we have kept the assumption that there is common certain belief of the game, meaning that the game is of 'complete information', while requiring only conditional belief in each subgame of opponent rationality, meaning that irrational opponent choices-although being probability zero events-are not impossible. We have shown how common certain belief of admissible consistency implies that each player deems it impossible that the opponent has preferences not in accordance 7 See Halpern (1998) for an instructive discussion of the differences between Aumann (1995) and Stalnaker (1998) , as well as how these relate to Samet (1996). with backward induction and thus interprets any deviation from the backward induction path as the opponent not having made a rational choice. In this way we present a model that combines a result that resembles Aumann (1995) by associating backward induction with certainty about opponent type, with an analysis that unlike Aumann's yields a theory of belief revision about opponent choice.
.2. Rationality orderings
The constructive proof of Proposition 8 shows how common certain belief of admissible subgame rationality may lead a type t of player i to have preferences over i's i t t i i strategies that are represented by a vNM utility function y satisfying y + z 5 u and an
[ LD(S ) with more than two levels of subjective probability
2). For example, in the centipede game of Fig. 1, common for j. However, the present construction of such a rationality ordering differs from the one proposed by Battigalli. This difference is along two dimensions.
1. Battigalli considers best responses in reachable subgames only (see his Definition 2.1), while here belief of opponent rationality is held in all subgames (cf. 'belief in each subgame of opponent rationality'). 2. Battigalli considers best responses given beliefs where opponent strategies that are less than 'most rational' are given positive probability, while here each player always believes that the opponent chooses rationally.
This difference has the following consequences.
• Although Battigalli's construction of rationality orderings also yields the backward induction outcome in any generic perfect information game, his proof (cf. Battigalli, 1997) is not tied to the backward induction procedure. • Battigalli's construction promotes the forward induction outcome in an extended version of the 'Battle-of-the-Sexes' (BoS) game where the BoS game is preceded by 1 being offered an outside option that is preferred by 1 to 2's most preferred outcome in the BoS game. This conclusion is not reached in the present analysis since there is no choice situation in which 1 under all circumstances will have a particular 8 preference between his BoS strategies. This also indicates how the epistemic foundation for backward induction offered here differs from the epistemic foundation for backward (and forward) induction provided by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2001) .
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A ppendix A. The decision-theoretic framework
The purpose of this appendix is to present the decision-theoretic terminology, notation and results utilized and referred to in the main text.
Consider a decision maker under uncertainty. Let F be a finite set of states, where the decision maker is uncertain about what state in F will be realized. Let Z be a finite set of outcomes. In the tradition of Anscombe and Aumann (1963) , the decision maker is endowed with a binary relation over all functions that to each element of F assigns an objective randomization on Z. Any such function x : F → D(Z) is called an act on F. • objective independence if x s (respectively | ) x iff gx 1 (1 2 g )y s
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(respectively | ) gx 1 (1 2 g )y , whenever 0 , g , 1 and y is arbitrary.
F F F F
• nontriviality if there exist x and y such that x s y .
F F F F F
If E # F, let x denote the restriction of x to E. Define the conditional binary relation E F 9 9 9 9 9 9
K by x K x if, for arbitrary y , (x , y )K (x , y ), where 2 E denotes F\E.
Say that the state f [ F is Savage-null if x | y for all acts x and y on F. A binary d )x s y s gx 1 (1 2 g )x whenever x s y s x .
• non-null state independence if x s y iff x s y whenever e and f are not
Savage-null and x and y satisfy x (e) 5 x ( f ) and y (e) 5 y ( f ). The following representation result due to Blume et al. (1991a, Theorem 3 .1) can now be stated. It requires the notion of a lexicographic probability system (LPS) which consists of L levels of subjective probability distributions: if L $ 1 and, ;, [ h1 
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Write F 5 F 3 F and let K be a binary relation on the set of acts on F. Say that 1 2 F K is the marginal of K on F if, x K y iff x K y whenever x ( f ) 5 x ( f , 
